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Abstract: This article, based on new archival materials, reconstructs the experiences and observations 
of an Indian war correspondent as, from 1944 to 1946, he covered the advance of Indian soldiers of 
the British-led Indian Army from northeast India, through Burma to Malaya at the war's end, then to 
their eventual deployment with the South East Asian Command in Java after the Japanese surrender. 
As it transpired, Captain P. R. S. Mani worked as an enlisted public relations officer of the British-led 
Indian Army but also sustained his commitment as a patriotic Indian nationalist, who gathered 
intelligence on the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia and on the impact of Subhas Chandra Bose’s 
Indian National Army. Relatively little scholarship has focused on Asian war journalism. Mani’s 
tension-ridden role as a self-styled ‘Indian Army observer’ provides an illuminating insight into the 
way Britain’s lines of communication were appropriated and subverted during wartime and beyond, 
and into the way his own nationalism was reshaped by his unofficial transnational activities. 
 
……………………………………………….. 
 
The transnational mission of an Indian war correspondent:  
P. R. S. Mani in Southeast Asia, 1944 – 1946 
 
Armies on the move have long generated lines of communication and flows of 
information that extended across vast distances. By the mid-twentieth century, the traffic in 
military information took the form of official dispatches, orders, intelligence and requests for 
supply, civilian propaganda, soldiers’ correspondence and war reportage, not to mention 
rumour. The media through which this information was conveyed ranged from the printed 
word to the new media of the day, radio and newsreel and even more widely by the old 
fashioned networks of word of mouth. Scholarly attention has begun to focus on the non-
European producers of such information during the twentieth century’s global conflicts, 
especially through the study of the letter-writing habits of Indian troops who fought for the 
British during World War One.1 This essay aims to make a further contribution to this 
literature by focusing on the still relatively neglected subject of the Asian war correspondent. 
It attempts to do so through adopting a micro-historical perspective which explores the 
writings of a south Indian journalist, P. R. S. Mani (1915-2011) at first as a military public 
relations officer then an independent war correspondent as he moved across Southeast Asia at 
a critical juncture in the region’s history.2 Certainly Mani’s whole earlier life story suggests 
the roots of many of his attitudes and actions during his time in Indonesia. 
																																								 																				
1 See David Omissi, Indian voices of the Great War: soldiers’ letters, 1914-1918, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999 and Santanu Das (ed.), Race, empire and First World War writing, Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2011. 
2 There is a noticeable lack of research on Asian war correspondents. The few exceptions include contributions 
by Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter in their edited volume Ruptured histories: war memory, and the post-
Cold War in Asia, Cambridge; MA: Harvard UP, 2007; Anne M. Blackburn in Locations of Buddhism: 
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P. R. Subrahmanyan, known subsequently as P. R. S. Mani, or just Mani, was born 
in 1915 near Madras and attended Madras Christian College before commencing his career as 
an investigative journalist. On 17 January, 1944, he was commissioned as a Captain in the 
Indian Army, which, in an India still under British colonial rule, was directly under the 
command of the British ‘Eastern Army’. As a journalist, Mani was assigned to a unit in the 
Directorate of Public Relations, which covered both ‘British and Indian Units’. He was 
required to report on the experiences and exploits of His Majesty’s Indian troops, for 
circulation among those troops, for broadcast by radio into India and for the information of 
the British Eastern Army Headquarters. His work producing morale-boosting dispatches 
while the war was being fought took him through Manipur to Burma, Malaya and Singapore. 
Following Japan’s surrender, Mani travelled with these Indian troops, as part of the British-
led South East Asian Command (SEAC), into Java. But Mani did not ever restrict himself to 
his official duties. Capitalizing on the transnational mobility which the war afforded him, he 
began to collect and ultimately circulate an alternative knowledge and intelligence directed at 
undermining British rule.  
Exploring a unique resource 
Together, Mani’s official dispatches, private diaries and published journalism provide an 
illuminating eye-witness account not only of his own developing views but of the activities 
and attitudes of Indian troops during the latter part of the war and its immediate aftermath. 
Just as significantly, these sources reveal how the British need to establish wartime lines of 
communication which brought news from the Asian front back home to India became 
appropriated and subverted. Reading Mani’s official output as a public relations officer 
among the Indian troops within the British Eastern Army or, as he consistently called his 
position, ‘Indian Army Observer’, alongside his unofficial writings as an Indian nationalist, 
we gain a valuable insight into how one colonial subject grappled with the tensions in his 
wartime enlistment. By travelling across the region with the Indian Army, under British 
command, Mani was able to compile what might be called, following James Scott, a ‘hidden 
transcript’, never made explicit in any one dispatch but which, when his many dispatches are 
read together, offered a narrative about what India could be without British rule.3 Mani’s 
dispatches from the Burma campaign, despite not being included in his book about his time in 
Indonesia, go a long way to explaining the content of his Indonesian writing once we begin to 
look for this ‘hidden transcript’. Furthermore, his writings overall reveal how his journey 
both before and after the end of the war gave new meaning to his anticolonial activities, as it 
became clear to him that India’s freedom struggle had become one part of a much wider pan-
Asian liberation struggle. 
This close focus is not intended to offer an overall history of the conflicts, but rather to 
bring attention for the first time to the presence of an Indian voice speaking from an 
embedded position with troops serving under British command during World War 2. It is 
unusual enough that a contemporary Indian account can be found from within the fighting 
forces during the war. But it is unprecedented to have the writings of an Indian observer 
during the two years after the war officially ended. There have been masterful studies of the 
battles and politics of the British-led South East Asian Command in this period in Indochina 
and Indonesia, notably that by Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper in their Forgotten Wars.4 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
colonialism and modernity in Sri Lanka, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2010; Emma Rothschild in The inner life of 
Empires: an eighteenth century history, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011. Through study of individual life-stories, 
these authors uncover transnational and global historical processes within the 18th and 19th century British 
Empire. 
3 James C. Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts, New Haven: Yale UP, 1990, 1-16. 
4 See also Peter Dennis, Troubled days of peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987 
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But when discussing Indian troops, they and other authors have relied virtually entirely on 
British sources, albeit occasionally the British officers commanding Indian troops.5 There are 
Indian authors in the work by Omissi6 and by Battacharya7, but those voices have been 
filtered through British surveillance. Both Omissi and Battacharya rely on British military 
censors’ readings of Indian troops’ letters home, with all the attendant linguistic issues, 
pointed out very clearly in Bayly’s Empire and Information.8 Santanu Das’ reflections on 
Bengali troop letters focuses, like Omissi’s work, on WWI.9 A somewhat stronger source for 
Indian troop views during the SEAC operation in Indonesia is Richard McMillan’s 2006 
analysis. McMillan interviewed British officers also but included also some comments with 
Indian troops.10 Srinath Raghavan’s recent India’s War draws much further on WWII Indian 
sources as it takes a broad view of the declared hostilities, but this valuable analysis of the 
whole period cannot focus on the tensions experienced by individuals.11 None of these 
authors can investigate and compare the public and private communications of any one 
Indian over a long term. 
Although drawing on all these wider studies for contextualization, this article turns 
instead to a close study of the deliberately public and the private statements of P. R. S. Mani, 
as the one Indian voice available over a sustained time, from 1944 to 1946 and over the 
crucial divide between declared war (ending with the Japanese surrender) and the ensuing 
undeclared conflicts with anti-colonial movements. We have three types of writing by Mani – 
two are public although for different audiences: his 1944 and 1945 dispatches which were 
ultimately for an audience of Indian troops but only after review by the British military (and 
which are often directly addressed to the British HQ), then his 1946 war correspondence 
journalism for the Free Press Journal of Bombay, aimed at both Indian nationalist and British 
left wing audiences. The third is the private writing which relates only to Indonesia – two 
bundles of pages from his personal diaries, typed up apparently close to the time the events 
were occurring in both 1945 and 1946.12  
The close of the war, bringing the end of the military threat of Fascism in general 
and of the Japanese invasion of India in particular, changed the situation for Indian 
nationalists whether in or out of uniform. This article asks how an Indian nationalist 
journalist, effectively still trapped after the war within the British-controlled Indian Army, 
responded to the dilemmas which he saw to be posed for Indian troops ordered into battle 
against the Indonesian Independence struggle. This carries with it a further puzzle: why does 
																																								 																				
5 British voices – even when they are the officers of Indian Army troops – are the sole and authoritative sources 
in virtually all accounts of the Indian Army, from the early 1951 regimental history by A.J.F. Doulton: The 
Fighting Cock: being a history of the 23rd Indian Division, 1942-47 Aldershot [England]: Gale & Polden, 1951, 
to the recent 2014 work of Daniel Marston: The Indian Army and the End of the Raj, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2014. 
6 David Omissi: The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1994; David 
Omissi (ed): Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers’ Letters, 1914-1918, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1999. 
Omissi’s work also focused largely on WWI, clearly a time of great ferment in nationalism as well as in battle 
experiences, and so relevant to this argument, but nevertheless a significantly different context to that of WWII. 
7 S. Battacharya: 2000: ‘British Military Information Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India 
during the Second World War’, Modern Asian Studies, 34:2, pp 483-510 
8 Christopher Bayly: Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 
1780-1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
9 Santanu Das, 2011: ‘Indians at home: Mesopotamia and France, 1914-1918, an intimate history’, in Das (ed) 
Race, Empire and First World War Writing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
10 R. McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian 
Revolution, Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.  
11 Srinath Raghavan, India’s War: World War II and the Making of Modern South Asia, New York: Basic 
Books, 2016. 
12 After Mani’s death in 2011, all papers found by Mani’s family were donated to the Blake Library, UTS.  
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this bundle of documents exist as a resource? The full answer to this puzzle is related to the 
first question, and will be discussed at the conclusion. The short answer, however, to the 
puzzle of the resources is that P. R. S. Mani himself selected the documents. He went from 
being a military officer, to being a war correspondent in 1946 for the Free Press Journal of 
Bombay, to becoming a press attaché to Nehru late in 1947 and then in 1949 moved into the 
newly established Foreign Service of independent India. He went on to have a distinguished 
career as a diplomat for his country, serving in Manilla, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Goa, West 
Germany, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Mauritius then eventually retiring in 1973 from his last 
position, as Ambassador to Sweden. He was on his retirement the longest serving member of 
the Indian Foreign Service.13 Over all these years, he apparently nursed a desire to write 
about his experiences during those tumultuous days of the Indonesian Revolution. To give 
himself sources to do so, Mani selected these papers, gathering some – or perhaps all – of his 
1944 and 1945 PR dispatches, his 1946 newspaper articles (which were otherwise 
anonymous – the Free Press Journal editor, S. Savanand, refused to allow any journalist to 
be identified as author)14 and a small number of pages he chose to keep from his diaries 
written during the events in Indonesia before and after his military role.  
This is clear evidence of Mani’s decisions about selection – although he seems to 
have been in the habit of keeping a diary, there are no diary pages from his service during the 
war: he apparently chose not to expose any differences there may have been between his 
official dispatches and his personal feelings. There are similarly no diary entries from any 
time during his later career as an Indian diplomat. He has kept only diary entries – and then 
only some – from the period in Indonesia, first under SEAC command, when he was 
experiencing growing frustration and then anger with British control, and then from his 
period as a war correspondent, when he was again experiencing frustration in his dealings 
with both British and Dutch military commanders. .  
Mani must have gone to great trouble to protect this large bundle of papers 
throughout his peripatetic life as a diplomat, and many of these papers were used almost 
verbatim in his 1986 book, Story of Indonesian Revolution, published by the University of 
Madras and translated into Bahasa Indonesia in 1989 as Jelak Revolusi 1945.  His family 
searched after Mani’s death in 2011, but found no other traces of his diaries, despatches or 
articles. The rest must have been destroyed or discarded long before. However, not all of the 
topics covered in the document package are included in the book. In particular, none of the 
stories arising from his many 1944 and 1945 dispatches sent during the Burma campaign are 
discussed at all in the book which concentrates on Mani’s life in Indonesia. While he may 
have had many reasons for excluding this material from the book, there still remains the 
question to which we will return, of why he had included the Manipur papers in this bundle in 
the first place, and then carried them around for so long.  
Mani and the Indian nation at war 
The ‘Indian Army’ which the British had assembled had seen many changes. After the Indian 
Uprising in 1957, known to the British as the ‘Indian Mutiny’, the British assumed state 
control over the British East India Company holdings and its armed forces. Distrustful of 
those Indians who had led the Uprising, the colonial army which the British Raj sought to 
recruit was made up of those Indians regarded as most likely to be loyal, and these were 
predominantly those from the north western states rather than those from Bengal and the 
south east whose troops had been prominent in the Uprising. It was the north-western men 
about whom the British developed a theory of Indian ‘martial races’ who were argued to be 
																																								 																				
13 Mani’s own biographical summary, written after 1977, P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 26. 
14 Letters and cables between S. Sadanand (Editor, FPJB) to P. R. S. Mani, 1946, P. R. S. Mani Collection, 
Series 18.  
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best constitutionally fitted for combat and discipline.15 Gajendra Singh has undertaken a 
careful analysis of the shifting attitudes within this colonial army and among the Punjabi and 
other north-western peoples who were experiencing foreign travel and residence in the early 
twentieth century. The Caliphate movement in Turkey, the Ghadar movement in the Canada 
and the United States and the international experiences of Indian troops during the First 
World War had radicalised the north-western diasporic populations of all religions, raising 
dissatisfaction among career soldiers in the Indian army who increasingly looked towards 
nationalism as an alternative to unquestioned loyalty to the British Empire. In response, as 
Singh has argued, the recruitment strategies of the British had already begun to alter during 
the 1930s, with more troops being sought from Bengal and the southern states than in 
previous decades.16 This was, however, a slow process. Even in 1942, this ‘colonial army’ 
had been compliant to British command, with its Indian troops firing on Indians on Indian 
soil during the Quit India conflict.17 It was still the case when Mani entered the war effort that 
the vast majority of the troops serving in the Indian Army had come from the north western 
states. For his purposes, as we discuss in the following section, Mani had to do a lot of leg 
work.  
Mani’s profession as a journalist was of great interest to the British command of the Eastern 
Army and there appear to have been a number of Indian journalists – some with newspaper 
experience and some, like Mani, from radio – who were drawn into the Public Relations 
Division.18 The war itself was a fearful spectacle which Indian media were anxious to cover, 
and so, when Mani was commissioned in January 1944, there had been Indian journalists 
involved in the war as correspondents for some time. One famous example was T. G. 
Narayanan, an outstanding journalist from the staff of The Hindu who became well known 
for his articles on the gruelling Bengal famine of 1943 (a catastrophe which directly resulted 
from wartime conditions) published in 1944 in book form.19 Narayanan and Mani had much 
in common and knew each other well. Both had studied at Madras Christian College and 
spent stints working at All India Radio before becoming war correspondents. The war then 
set them on common transnational trajectories. Once Narayanan became war correspondent 
for the Hindu, he, like Mani, travelled to Manipur and then Burma, covering the battles with 
the Japanese and then their retreat down the spine of Burma into Malaya. When Japan 
																																								 																				
15 Heather Streets: Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. Tarak Barkawi (2015) has pointed out with particular reference 
to Sikh troops, that such Victorian racial categories were firstly fantasies which accorded with both British and 
Indian mythology but then ‘were made real through imperial power and military organisation’ (emphasis in 
original, p 30), ‘Subaltern Soldiers: Eurocentricism and the Nation-State in the Combat Motivation Debates’, pp 
24-45, in Anthony King (ed) Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
16 Gajendra Singh: 2006: ‘The anatomy of dissent in the military of colonial India during the First and Second 
World Wars’ Edinburgh Papers In South Asian Studies, Number 20; idem, 2014: The Testimonies of Indian 
Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy, London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. See 
also Kris Manjapra and Sugata Bose (eds) Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation 
of Ideas, London: Palgrave, 2010. 
17 Srinath Raghavan, 2016, op.cit. pp 274-5. 
18 Karl Hack: ‘Imperial systems of power, colonial forces and the making of modern Southeast Asia’ in Tobias 
Rettig and Karl Hack (eds) Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, London and NY: Routledge, 2009, pp 3-38. 
19 T. G. Narayanan: Famine over Bengal, Calcutta: Pari Press, 1944. Bengal was not the only place gravely short 
of food during the war, although it was the most severely affected. See also Zook, Darren C.:  ‘Famine in the 
Landscape: Imagining Hunger in South Asian History, 1860–1990’ in Mahesh Rangarajan and K. 
Sivaramakrishan (ed) India’s Environmental History, Vol 2, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2011, pp 400-428.  
Mani became aware that many of the Punjabi and other troops were anxious about the food shortages in their 
home areas, undermining their morale. Narayanan’s writing as a correspondent in Indonesia in 1946 is discussed 
in my forthcoming book: Beyond Borders: Indonesian Independence in the Eyes of the Region, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press.  
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surrendered, Narayanan went to Batavia, still reporting for the Hindu, to cover the emerging 
conflict between the Indonesian Republicans, the British-led forces of the South East Asia 
Command, the Dutch seeking to return and, in some cases, the Japanese whom the British 
recruited to maintain policing duties.  
 Mani, however, unlike Narayanan, reported on the war from within the British-
controlled Indian Army as a commissioned officer. His decision to take up this role must 
have involved tensions, as it did for the many Indians who decided to enlist in the British-
controlled forces in the middle of the war. For Mani the sources of tension were multiple. In 
Madras before the war, he had certainly developed an internationalist outlook through his 
interest in Theosophy, even though the Theosophists opposed non-violence. At the 
Theosophical Society’s international headquarters, just south of the city at Adyar, he met its 
European visitors during the 1930s. His meetings with Dutch Theosophists would later 
contribute to his puzzlement that the Dutch colonialists he encountered in Indonesia could be 
so very different.20 Mani’s great passion was for Indian nationalism, as the title page of his 
personal copy of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Whither India? made abundantly clear. In a hand-
written homage to Nehru’s ideas dated 8 March 1939, just six months before the 
commencement of World War Two, Mani revealed the strength of his anticolonial 
sentiments: 
 
A very wonderful book giving lucidly in a few pages the case for Socialism in this country and 
elsewhere. His exposition of capitalism as a vicious circle is highly logical as well as equitable. It is 
the only remedy for the economic crippling of our Motherland even before the influence of capitalism 
is felt. Mohammed Ghani could be pardoned but not the British. The former’s raid on the Temple of 
Sarnath was with a religious fervour – the latter raping the Indian Peasantry of their wealth and 
happiness is highly selfish and typical of the British. Those of our own countrymen who were and are 
abetting this crime, stand condemned by their own shame which will come upon them when India 
becomes energetic.  
The vision of India is not far off and those of us who can search their hearts can hear the call 
even now. It is not by convention that this purpose is going to be achieved but through revolution – 
not a revolution in blood but a non-violent and very dynamic one taught to me by a great leader of 
men, Mahatma Gandhi.21 
 
That Mani, despite holding this commitment to Gandhian civil disobedience and 
the view that the British had raped the ‘Indian Peasantry of their wealth and happiness’, 
should then accept a commission in the British-led Indian Army for three years reflects his 
grave concerns about the danger which Fascism posed for the world, not just for Europe. By 
this time too, the Japanese control over South East Asia seemed from the outside to be secure 
and increasingly threatening as Calcutta was bombed even more severely than before in 
December 1943. 22 The motives of subject peoples enlisting in colonial armies had been 
																																								 																				
20 Details of Mani’s early career are found in his own two biographical outlines held in the P. R. S. Mani 
Collection, Series 20 and Series 26, Blake Library, University of Technology, Sydney (UTS). The first was 
probably prepared in 1947 for his application for employment to the newly independent India’s Foreign Service. 
The second was compiled after 1977, Mani having already retired in 1973. These details are confirmed by other 
documents found in the P. R. S. Mani Collection, by his publications (referenced below) and by his obituary 
(see also http://www.imorial.com/P. R. S. Mani/ [accessed 26 July, 2015]) Confirmation of Mani’s resume has 
also been provided by his sons, who donated the collection to the Blake Library.  
21 Mani’s signed note on Jawaharlal Nehru’s Whither India, 4th edition (1937), dated 8th March, 1939, from the 
P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 1 
22 Awareness of the dangers of Fascism to India as well as to Europe were a major factor in the decisions many 
strongly nationalist Indians to take up arms with the Allies during the war. This was the case with many in M.N. 
Roy’s Radical Democratic Party, formed in 1940, and which opposed the call of the Quit India movement to 
oppose the Allies until Britain agreed to leave India. Kris Manjapra: M.N. Roy and Colonial Cosmopolitanism, 
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complex at any time in the past. The coming of the Second World War had complicated these 
motives even further, as Indian nationalists were so often, as was Mani in 1943, very aware 
of international events.23   
Mani later recalled his personal need to do something to aid the anti-Axis war 
effort.24  Yet despite this decision, he sustained a sense of his role in the army as serving the 
coming India, not the British. The Directorate of Public Relations (PR) into which he was 
commissioned addressed itself to both ‘British and Indian units’, included both European and 
non-European PR officers and was expected by the British Army and British government to 
build up the fighting spirit of the Indian troops.25 This morale-building role was spelled out in 
a text that was included in the cover of the division’s officially issued notebooks, which Mani 
possessed: 
 
You will never get a chap to fight if he has something on his mind: Today YOU officers, British and 
Indian, are true trainers and YOURS is the task of taking these ‘somethings’ off the mind of each 
soldier by understanding, by interest, by sympathy and by explanation.26 
 
Mani, however, did not see his role in such terms. He always signed his dispatches 
as ‘Mani, Indian Army Observer’ rather than ‘Public Relations’ officer. Writing, as did 
Narayanan, as a Tamil who originated from a part of India culturally distinct from the states 
of the west and northwest, from where the majority of Indian troops still came, a recurring 
theme in his dispatches became the Indian national unity being created on foreign battlefields. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
New Delhi: Routledge India, 2010. Mani did not, however, endorse Roy’s Radical Democratic Party, scathingly 
dismissing its claim to be ‘the only socialist party’ in India as ‘propaganda’ in his diary entry of 12 May 1946, 
P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 8. 
23 Rettig and Hack, Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, See chapters by Hack (1, 2 and 10) and by Robert H. 
Taylor (8). These mixed motives were to be severely tested – and ultimately frayed – in the conflicts in Indo-
China and Indonesia. See also Gajendra Singh: ‘The anatomy of dissent in the military of colonial India during 
the First and Second World Wars’ Edinburgh Papers In South Asian Studies, Number 20, 2006; and The 
Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy, London and New York, 
Bloomsbury, 2014. 
24 P. R. S. Mani, The Story of Indonesian Revolution 1945-1950, Monograph 6, Chennai: Centre for South and 
Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, 1986, pp ix-x. Translated into Bahasa Indonesia and published 
as Jelak Revolusi in 1989.  
25Christopher Bayly discussed the cultural challenges faced by early British colonial information management in 
India in his  2000: Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-
1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. S. Battacharya in ‘British Mililtary Information 
Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier’, Modern Asian Studies, 34/2 (2000) pp 483-510 and 
David Omissi: Indian Voices of the Great War - Soldiers' Letters, 1914 – 18, Hammondsworth: Penguin, 2014, 
have both discussed the use of censors to ascertain the concerns of Indian troops. None of these analysts, 
however, discuss the operation of public relations officers nor of the independent press and of war 
correspondents. These issues are considered in Milton Israel: Communications and Power: Propaganda and the 
press in the Indian nationalist struggle, 1920-1947, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994; Deep Kanta 
Lahiri Choudhury: Telegraphic Imperialism: crisis and panic in the Indian Empire, c. 1830, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010 and Prue Torney-Parlicki: Somewhere in Asia: War, Journalism and Australia’s Neighbours 
Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000. The use of what was then a very contemporary ‘new media’, radio, is discussed at 
length in R O’G Benedict Anderson’s Java in a Time of Revolution, Jakarta: Equinox Asia, 2005, (without any 
reference to Indians) and the use of radio as a weapon on both sides of the decolonization dispute in Indonesia – 
as it had been used during the war itself – becomes very clear in the P. R. S. Mani archive, in particular in Series 
8.  
26The passage quoted here was printed on the inside front cover of the Directorate of Public Relations 
Handbook, containing ‘hints’ written ‘for British and Indian units’. Mani kept only the cover of this Handbook 
because he used it to protect his own collection of the final copy of the dispatches he cabled to the Directorate. 
He obscured most of the handbook’s front cover by pasting over it a sheet inscribed with his own handwritten 
title: ‘Mani: Indian Army Observer (20 May 1944 – 1 Nov 1944), Battle of Manipur Stories.’ See P. R. S. Mani 
Collection, Series 2. 
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Acting to subvert the British strategy of ‘divide and rule’ aimed at marginalising any unified 
Indian nationalist sentiment, he sought to inform all Indian troops – as well as the wider 
Indian public – about the diverse origins and religions of their fellow countrymen in different 
units. At the same time, in the filing of such reports, Mani fulfilled his official morale-
boosting duties. He clearly felt, as he noted in his diary during October 1945, an intense 
loyalty to the Indian troops who made up a substantial proportion of the British forces which 
marched across Southeast Asia. He was also aware that the British press and military 
information machine paid little attention to the Indian soldiers who were fighting so bravely 
and in so many different parts of the army.27  
At what must have been a significant effort, Mani tracked down Indian troops from 
many origins. The Imperial War Museum (IWM) film footage of the crucial Allied victory at 
the Battle of Imphal in Manipur in mid-1944 makes for an instructive comparison. Filmed by 
British cinematographers, the IWM cameras focussed consistently on the British troops, with 
shots composed so that the troops who were not British (with the occasional exception of 
Nepali Gurkhas) were placed on the edges of the frame, or too far away to be individually 
identified. By contrast, each of Mani’s 80-plus dispatches from this battle, collected in a 
notebook he entitled The Battle of Manipur, was a tightly crafted vignette in ‘human interest’ 
journalistic style, highlighting the actions and personality of a different, named Indian soldier 
or group of fighting men from different Indian localities, from provinces as far apart as 
Madras and the Punjab. Furthermore, he sought out women nurses in Chittagong and the 
refugees, many of them women, who were fleeing from Japanese-controlled areas in Burma 
into Assam. Many of the troops were Hindu but from a range of different castes, and some 
were Muslim. Some were subaltern foot soldiers and some officers. Some were tank drivers, 
some artillerymen and others mule handlers. Mani chose to profile each in turn, introducing, 
in effect, the diverse soldiers of Britain’s Indian Army to one another – seeking out their 
many different origins and affiliations, celebrating their achievements, and ensuring that all 
of them were recognised for their courage, initiative and resilience.28  
Mani chose a variety of subjects to profile. Some were young officers, just graduated, 
including some who were Rajputs from the north western states whom the British had 
identified as ‘martial’ and whom Mani as well portrayed as courageous fighters. Yet he also 
celebrated the tenacity of much more humble troops, like the mule handler who had also 
served in World War 1, whom he carefully identified in his dispatch of 27 June from Imphal 
as ‘Risaldar Ghulam Mohideen, a Tiwana Punjabi Muslim of Mitha, Tiwana, tehail Khush 
Ab, district Shahpur and troop commander in an Animal Transport Company’ carrying 
supplies up gruelling mountains to get them to the troops.29 The terrain around Imphal was so 
steep that no other transport except mules could be used, and the handlers were crucial to the 
campaign.30 On the occasion about which Mani wrote, Ghulam Mohideen had had no rest but 
had not hesitated to manage the difficult movement of another essential load. Although 
coming under heavy fire, he delivered all the supplies but had had to leave two mules which 
had slipped down a steep crevass. On his return journey, he went back to the same crevasse 
and rescued the animals.  
Each of the men was portrayed as demonstrating great valour for their country – not 
for England, but for a diverse India. In a characteristic extract, his dispatch from Imphal of 13 
June 1944 describes a battle on the Tiddim Road. Mani wrote:  
																																								 																				
27 P. R. S. Mani, Diary entry, 26 October, 1945, P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 6. 
28 P. R. S. Mani, ‘Mani: Indian Army Observer (20 May 1944 – 1 Nov 1944), Battle of Manipur Stories’, P. R. 
S. Mani Collection, Series 2. While celebrating the Indian soldiers, each vignette was written in conventional 
militaristic style, with the Japanese invariably dehumanised as ‘the Jap’ or a faceless enemy.  
29 P. R. S. Mani, dispatch, 27 June, 1944, Imphal, P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 2.  
30 Raghu Karnad: Farthest Field: An Indian Story of the Second World War, New York: WW Norton, 2015 
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…eight drivers of a GPT company … coming from different parts of India, saved all their vehicles 
from the enemy who were close on their heels even though their tyres were flat and their hydraulic 
brakes refused to work because of the damage due to enemy shelling…remaining cool and calm, they 
succeeded in rescuing all the vehicles, leaving none behind.31 
 
In addition, Mani sought to connect this diverse yet unified Indian army on the move 
with its homeland. As well as researching and writing his dispatches of the Indian nation at 
war, he was active in attending to the interests, and therefore the morale, of the Indian troops, 
ensuring for example, that they had access to entertainment and news from home through 
radio, the modern electronic medium with which he was so familiar.32 
 
The patriotic investigator: Mani and the Indian diaspora 
As Mani made his transnational trek across Southeast Asia with the British Army, his 
activities extended beyond merely attending to the Indians who served within it. He 
continued to see himself as an investigative journalist, so wherever he went, he wanted to 
understand local conditions and he searched out local contacts through whom he might gain 
access to such knowledge. In this respect, his Tamil background helped him greatly. As he 
travelled, he stayed in close touch with T. G. Narayanan and found many other fellow Tamils 
in Southeast Asia – not only in Manipur but, as the Japanese Army retreated, also in Burma 
and Malaya. To locate and write about the small number of southern Indians among the 
Indian troops for his dispatches, Mani had had to be very active in seeking them out. In 
contrast, war-torn Southeast Asia contained substantial Tamil and Malayali-speaking 
communities, many of whom had come as indentured agricultural workers for colonial 
plantations or as labourers on railways or other industrial development. Others had come as 
traders or professionals like lawyers and doctors.33 Some had fled the invading Japanese – 
including the family of Mani's future wife – to eventually arrive in Manipur or move on 
further into other eastern Indian states. Others, including those who had left India in protest 
against the rule of the British, refused to leave Burma or Malaya when the Japanese occupied 
it.34  
Many of these southern Indians took up roles in the Indian Independence Leagues 
(IILs), the civilian organisations which arose across Southeast Asia from early-1942 to 
articulate the interests of local diasporic Indian communities and express their opposition to 
the continued British presence in India. Although the relationship between the IILs and the 
Japanese varied and was often uneasy, the Japanese authorities tolerated these bodies. Many 
of the IIL members also supported or joined the emerging Indian National Army (INA), 
following its revival under the charismatic Bengali Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose in 
1943.35 A great deal has now been written about the INA, but during the war and the resulting 
																																								 																				
31 P. R. S. Mani, dispatch, 13 June, 1944, Imphal, P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 2. 
32 Reference to such news and the use of radio can be found throughout the P. R. S. Mani Collection, 
specifically in the ‘Battle of Manipur Stories’ (Series 2) and in the scripts for radio broadcasts by Mani from 
Calcutta on All India Radio, 2 September 1944, p5, (Series 3) 
33 P. R. S. Mani, The Story of Indonesian Revolution, 1945 – 1950., pp x, 65-66..  
34 One such person was Gouri Sen’s father, a Tamil lawyer who had left India to live in Rangoon. Gouri Sen 
born 1923 in Rangoon, who herself became member of the Rani of Jhansi Unit of INA, was interviewed in 1996 
for the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library which holds her interview transcript at Teen Murti, New Delhi, 
Accession Number 647. She explained that her father told her he would not return to his homeland in India until 
it was independent of the British.  
35 This article focuses on references to the INA which appear in Mani’s 1940s writing. As this article explains, 
Mani attempted to research the INA in Burma with T.G. Narayanan but information was scattered in that period. 
There is now a large body of relevant secondary analyses on the INA, and to a lesser extent, on the IILs, and it 
has been drawn on to contextualize Mani’s references. In particular, the following have been useful: most 
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trials of INA members, the British attempted to limit severely the circulation of information 
about it. As far as Mani knew when he was first commissioned, the INA had been recruited 
from both Indian troops who had formerly been prisoners of the Japanese, and Indian 
volunteers from across Southeast Asia – both men and women. Mani understood that Bose, 
by drawing some support from Britain’s enemies, planned to release India from the British 
yolk through an attack on her borders which would stoke an internal rebellion led by 
sympathetic patriots. Just as with the IILs, the Japanese endorsed the INA’s objectives, yet 
the relationship between both was far from smooth. Ultimately, the INA became itself a 
rallying-point for diasporic Indians coming from very distinct backgrounds and diverse 
places of origin. It is known, for example, that around 75 Indian men travelled from the 
Indian communities across what was then the Netherlands East Indies, to join the INA in 
Malaya.36  
Mani’s attitude to the INA was ambivalent. As an avowed opponent of international 
fascism, Mani was not sympathetic to Bose nor the military strategies of the INA. He was, 
nevertheless, interested in the INA’s relationships with local Southeast Asian Indian 
populations whom he had witnessed to be exploited as indentured plantation labourers (as in 
Malaya) or as industrial workers (as in Burma). Others who enlisted in the INA or gave it 
their support came from the ranks of merchants or professionals such as lawyers. For Mani, 
many of the latter became articulate informants as to the conditions of Indian communities 
living under both the present Japanese and the earlier British occupations. Their evidence 
formed part of a detailed report on the INA and local Indian populations, ‘painfully compiled’ 
over several months as Mani described it, by T.G. Narayanan with Mani’s assistance. The 
research often required both men to seek contacts in territory beyond the control of the British 
forces. In Mani’s opinion, Bose and the INA recognised the disadvantaged industrial and civil 
conditions of the local Indian populations, and so had come to espouse not just a military 
strategy – which Mani continued to reject - but also a social platform, of which Mani strongly 
approved.37  
Mani also paid close attention, as he explained in his 1986 book, to the relationship 
between the INA and the Japanese. He came to the conclusion that although the INA under 
Bose may have been in alliance with the Japanese it was not, in either a political or military 
sense, dependent on or subservient to Japan. This conclusion proved important in Mani's 
subsequent assessment of Indonesian republicans such as Sukarno, who having taken 
leadership roles under the Japanese and cooperated with their civil structure, still claimed their 
independence from Japanese control. In Mani's view, this claim could be validated by the 
autonomy of action he had witnessed among the INA leadership in their own dealings with 
the occupying Japanese.38  
After the report was completed, Mani carried it back to India to deliver to Nehru in 
person. He did so at a key time in the history of the Indian freedom struggle, probably in late-
1944 or early-1945, when he returned to India in his military PR role to give radio broadcasts 
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37 Mani, Indonesian Revolution, pp x, 33, 65-66. Mani wrote that he delivered the Narayanan report by hand to 
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38 Mani, Indonesian Revolution, p. 33. 
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about the conditions of the Indian troops in Manipur and Burma.39 At this stage, the British 
Army was attempting to keep the existence of the INA a secret and hence Mani's dispatches 
never mention it. However, the INA had begun to broadcast its existence and rationale over 
short wave radio, news which is understood to have reached some people in eastern India as 
well as Indians who had remained inside Malaya and Burma.40 Mani's delivery of the report 
was apparently successful, but the document itself has yet to be found among the Nehru 
Papers held in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Nonetheless, its composition 
reveals much about war’s globalizing function in the transmission of information. The lines of 
communication, the mobility and the access to local intelligence which the conflict opened up 
for Mani enabled his ultimate subversion of the role of colonial intermediary. That he was 
able to play such a double game, as both loyal propagandist and anticolonial investigative 
reporter, is indicative of the difficulties encountered by the British Empire at war in 
controlling and censoring the transnational communications of its colonial subjects. 
 
Into the cauldron of decolonization: Java after the war 
As a passionate nationalist whose international concerns had drawn him into the alliance with 
the British, Mani found himself in a further dilemma when the Japanese surrendered in 
August 1945. Once the immediate threat of Japanese invasion had passed, a simmering anger 
resurfaced within India as a consequence of the British refusal to quit, one that became 
widely evident in Indian newspapers of which not only Mani himself but Indian troops in 
general were well aware.41 Compounding this, there was no change for the Indian troops who 
served the British in its Eastern Army following the end of hostilities; there was certainly no 
automatic discharge for Mani himself. Rather, each of their terms of duty continued and the 
British continued to regard the Indians as reliable troops in its ‘colonial army’ who could be 
expected to go on obeying orders. Mani was confronted with the implications of his 
enlistment – he, like the career soldiers about whom he had been writing, were part of a 
standing army controlled by the British.  
Mani was alarmed to realise that were all now to be moved over into the flashpoint 
areas of the region, in particular into Indochina and Indonesia, where nationalist movements 
had already emerged. The British had assumed leadership of the South East Asian Command 
(SEAC), nominally to accept the Japanese surrender and restore civilian order. In practice, 
the very existence of SEAC facilitated the restoration of the old European imperial controls. 
Mani was from the outset very unhappy about this situation but believed, so he later recalled, 
that he should remain with the troops as he was one of the few who were recording their 
perspectives.42  
 Mani therefore remained in his role as an official chronicler of the experiences of 
Indian troops who fought for the British after the war, loyally submitting his dispatches to the 
same Directorate of Public Relations which had served the Eastern Army with both British 
and Indian units. At the same time he continued to embed traces within these official writings 
of a clearly patriotic message and to compile his hidden transcript as a patriotic investigative 
journalist. These traces can be seen in, for example, an official dispatch from 29 September 
1945, in which he described the pan-Asian hopes and aspirations of the troops as they crossed 
over to Java:  
 
																																								 																				
39 Ibid, p.65; transcripts of radio broadcasts in P. R. S. Mani Collection, Series 3.   
40 See, for example, Gouri Sen interviewed in 1996, transcript, NMML; Dr. S. Padmavati, (born in Burma and 
sister-in-law of P. R. S. Mani) interviewed, January 2014.  
41 Free Press Journal of Bombay, September 29, 1945, p. 1; Hindusthan Standard, September 29, 1945, p. 1. 
42 Mani, Indonesian Revolution, p. 59. 
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…to [I]ndian troops Java brings back the memories of Indian colonization in the country in the early 
centuries of its occupation by the ‘pallava’, ‘cholas’ and the ‘gupta’ of Indian history. Though not 
fully conversant the Indian ‘jaman’ [sic] has a vague idea of this ancient connection and [is] 
extremely anxious to renew and strengthen this centuries old bond of friendship. These views were 
expressed to me while on board by a [S]ikh soldier from Punjab.43    
 
At the same time, Mani and the Indian troops he travelled with would have been made well 
aware of the bitterness back home which greeted the British decision to use Indian troops 
across Southeast Asia, and, in particular, of the popular outrage at their deployment in 
Indochina, where they had been involved in fighting Vietnamese nationalists. 44  Some 
English-born troops in the British Army in Indonesia became likewise uneasy about the role 
they were being asked to play in this effective recolonization, with one group writing to the 
Labour Prime Minister in London to protest at the position into which they were being forced, 
while Indonesians themselves had also heard about the use of British troops against the Indo-
Chinese nationalists.45 In the official dispatch cited above, Mani displayed a very British 
talent for strategic understatement when he observed that the ‘local reaction’ to the arrival of 
Indian troops in Batavia ‘has been a little lukewarm owing to strong nationalist feelings’. His 
diary reveals that the crowds who greeted them were silent, that anti-British graffiti was 
displayed across all the buildings and that as the troops were taken into their barracks it was 
clear they were not at all welcome.46 
 Mani’s official dispatches from Batavia continued to reveal patriotic traces. He 
reported that the Indian troops there were largely asked to do no more than simple policing 
duties, and he registered his dissatisfaction with the menial nature of the tasks they were 
asked to perform for British officers.47 In Batavia, he again stayed in close contact with T. G. 
Narayanan, whose series of thoughtful features for the Hindu over the next few months, as 
events on the ground spiralled out of control, were deeply critical of the British.48 Narayanan 
explained that the chaos in Batavia was caused by the many competing forces in the city and 
he pointed his readers instead to the situation in Bandung, where the nationalists were largely 
in control and where order and calm prevailed. It was the Dutch and the British, he argued, 
who were responsible for Batavia becoming ungovernable.49  
Meanwhile, Mani himself, while again ensuring the Indian troops he was with had 
access to recreational radio, strove as an investigative journalist to gain his own critical 
appraisal of the political situation. Through October, Mani set about meeting and getting to 
know Batavia’s Indonesian nationalist leadership and became particularly close friends with 
Sutan Sjahrir, whom Sukarno later appointed Prime Minister in November 1945, and the 
charismatic leftist Amir Sjarifuddin, who founded the Indonesian Socialist Youth party also 
in November 1945 and was later also to be Prime Minister in the following year.50 At this 
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time, October 1945, Mani’s British paymasters were scathing about such figures. They 
described Batavia, where many such nationalist leaders were based, and in which substantial 
numbers of Dutch were seeking to be restored to power, as confused and disordered. They 
depicted Sukarno as a quisling because of his earlier collaboration with the Japanese. Sjahrir 
was preferred, as he had led resistance struggles against the Japanese, but neither he nor the 
left-leaning Sjarifuddin were trusted by the British.51 
After only a few weeks, the 23rd Indian Division with whom Mani was posted, 
including Mahratti and Rajput artillerymen, as well as troops from other Indian regions, were 
sent to Surabaya. The political situation here contrasted markedly with that in Batavia as the 
city was completely in the hands of Indonesian nationalists, in a series of alliances which drew 
in all groups. The Surabaya administration was being led by the established elites, the priyayi, 
but they were supported both by the younger revolutionary nationalists, the pemuda, and by 
the broader mass of Surabaya working people, the arek Surabaya from the port city’s 
neighbourhoods, the kampungs.52 The Japanese had surrendered to a small group of impatient 
Dutch, who were then promptly imprisoned by Indonesian republicans who assumed control of 
the whole Japanese armoury. Surabaya was, in fact, the only Indonesian city in which 
nationalists formed the sole civil structure, for even in Bandung some British and Dutch were 
present. The republican government in the city was clearly effective. By the time the British 
and Indian troops of SEAC arrived, having been delayed by the logistics of evacuating 
internees from other cities, civil order had been firmly established for some weeks. 
Mani’s official dispatches and private observations provide us with an invaluable 
testimony as to the origins of the violent and tragic events which followed. In an early dispatch 
from the city, designated ‘Press Flash Immediate’ and sent to the Public Relations and 
Divisional HQ in Singapore, he was notably more open in his depiction of the hostility of the 
crowd at the docks who witnessed the Indian troops’ arrival: ‘As in Batavia, local reception 
was cold and unenthusiastic and anti-Dutch slogans greeted us all over the harbour.’53 In the 
same dispatch of October 25 he recorded that there ‘were no incidents’, and in a further report 
on October 26: “The occupation by Indian troops is proceeding peacefully according to plan… 
so far there has been no hitch….” Yet his hidden transcript, in the form of his personal diary, 
told a completely different story. His entries for Surabaya from October 25 to 28 revealed that 
the hostility of the Indonesians to what they saw as another colonial army had taken its toll on 
the morale of Indian troops.54 From their very first sight of the city, their anxiety had increased 
as the reality of their reception, which Mani only hinted at in his official dispatches, sank in: 
  
The port is ‘decorated’ with anti-Dutch and anti-imperialist slogans, and for the first time in Java, 
slogans have also appeared in Hindustani: “Azadi ya Khunrezi!” (Freedom or Bloodshed!) Its effect 
on Indian troops, especially the Mahrattas and Rajrifs, who compose the Brigade, is remarkable. 
Reports have reached me that they are already beginning to ask their officers if they have to fight the 
Indonesians….55 
 
The suspicion emanating from the many armed Indonesian troops whom Mani saw on 
the streets intensified his own doubts about his role, as he continued in this 25th October entry: 
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In the light of incidents in and around Batavia, I think they are beginning to regard us as the vanguard 
of Dutch Imperialism. The pity is that we are all Indians here, and appreciate like their leaders in 
Batavia that we have not come to Java of our own volition. 
 
In the same diary entry, Mani observed that the British commander Brigadier Mallaby 
had handled his first meeting with local Indonesian leaders very poorly. The British had made 
it clear they were not prepared to accept republican control as 'normalcy' and that they would 
insist on the start of talks which would facilitate the return of Dutch control of the port. 
Nevertheless, the initial British negotiation with the republican mayor of the city appeared to 
commit the British to remaining confined within the port area itself, on the mouth of the river 
and at the edge of the town. As Mani saw it, Mallaby had been insensitive and rude and had 
apparently failed completely to appreciate the position of the Indonesian priyayi authorities 
who were trying to allay the anxieties of the various groups of nationalists in the city, that is, 
the pemuda and the arek Surabaya.56  
By the time he made his next diary entry on 26 October – hurriedly typed and closely 
spaced - he was seriously alarmed. He felt that Mallaby’s second conference with the local 
Surabaya leadership had also gone badly, with the Brigadier appearing to have been 
contemptuous of Indonesian armed strength. Mani wrote: ‘Brig Mall does not appear to guage 
the situation here properly and pooh-poohs Indonesian might. Playing for time, usual game.’ 
Mani continued: “A thousand Regrets I am not a free correspondent to report what I 
observe. Anyway, duty by troops from my own country and cannot leave them.” He went to 
bed “with a vague suspicion there may be a bloodbath in store for us.....”57 Worse was to 
come on 27 October with the dropping by the British of leaflets in Indonesian, which Mani 
could read with the Malay he had picked up during the Malaya and Burma campaigns. These 
leaflets demanded that the Indonesian forces give up their arms, which was explicitly contrary 
to the commitments Mani knew that Mallaby had earlier given. He wrote: ‘I feel that the 
proud Indonesians would not give up their arms until the Dutch menace is removed.’58  
In his diary entry describing Mallaby’s evening press conference, Mani revealed his 
own deep frustration and anger at the ‘arrogance’ and distortion occurring: 
 
All serious faces at Brig HQ. Aslam, Chopra, Singh [Indian officers] all look grave. I understand 
situation serious but Brig does not want us to report so. He wants to vet our copies and most 
correspondents unwillingly agree. I am furious that truth is being suppressed but can do little and 
escape by blaming Betty [his superior officer] for letting down PR and taking such orders lying down. 
More because my copies are unnecessarily delayed by him and the signals. Appears to me brigadier is 
posing calm exterior though he is very much perturbed….. He tells us that he had emphatically told 
the locals that he was the ruler of the place and they have to obey him. I consider this sheer arrogance 
and left the conference sadly disappointed at the ability of our leaders to avert incidents.59  
 
The embedded eyewitness: Mani and the Battle for Surabaya 
Mani’s official and unofficial writings from Surabaya provide us with an embedded eye-
witness account of one aspect of the events in Surabaya which have largely been ignored in 
the current historiography, especially by historians who have not dwelt on the extent to which 
there were other Indian troops on the ground in the city, in addition to the Gurkhas.60 The 
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history of the Indian 23rd Division, The Fighting Cock, by a British officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel AJF Doulton, portrays Indian troops in Surabaya as if they were in complete 
isolation from any local population, other than in engagements with the people it identifies as 
‘the enemy’.61 By contrast, Mani had already pointed out in official dispatches from Batavia 
that some Indian soldiers had been born and raised in the Dutch East Indies, in Medan in one 
case, and spoke fluent Malay. Now, from Surabaya, he sent further reports, on 27 October, 
which detailed the contact made between the Indian 23rd and members of Surabaya’s local 
civilian Indian community. In these, Mani described the crucial role played by local Indian 
merchants in securing the peaceful initial landing of Indian troops. Indonesian nationalist 
leaders had been in close communication with resident Indian leaders, who had then 
approached an Indian Major leading troops into the city and successfully persuaded him to 
camp for the night outside the urban area. Such a recognition of the presence and active role 
of local Indian populations cannot be found in the British accounts of the day, except in the 
underlying suspicion with which the British military consistently regarded local Indians.62  
 Once again, the fraught local situation Mani encountered also triggered his 
inclinations as an investigative journalist. Having been billeted at Surabaya’s Liberty Hotel, 
in the company of other PR staff and members of the Allied forces’ RAPWI (Recovery of 
Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) mission, and away from most of the Indian troops, he 
began to make forays into the city to learn more about it, its people, and the predicament in 
which they found themselves. In this respect, his principal informant was a Sindhi merchant 
called T. D. Kundan, who was trusted by the Indonesian nationalists and who gave Mani 
'plenty of dope on the local situation'. As Mani reviewed what he was seeing as well as this 
new information, he wrote of his sorrow: 
  
for the Indian troops who are weary of war and are longing to be back home. These famous warriors 
seem to be forever trapped in the web of destiny to which they so pathetically cling.63 
  
On the morning of October 28, Mani spent more time with Kundan over lunch and 
returned to the Liberty Hotel around 4pm. Not long afterwards, he heard the first shots ring 
out as the Battle for Surabaya began in earnest. Earlier, Mallaby had ordered the Indian troops 
to be deployed across the city far beyond the port area, in what was another contravention of 
the agreement previously reached with the local authorities. The Brigadier ordered the Indian 
troops to set up in small units, referred to as 'penny packets', within the kampungs, or 
neighbourhoods of Surabaya. But since these forces were heavily outnumbered, this proved, 
in the event, no more than a symbolic occupation of the city.64  
When the battle commenced the Liberty Hotel was soon besieged and all radio 
communication outwards cut off. Mani, as a Captain, was second in command for the Indian 
troops posted at the hotel to defend the journalists and RAPWI staff. He moved from position 
to position to support the soldiers but also tried to monitor the radio. Although he could not 
get messages out, he could hear the harrowing ‘Mayday’ calls from the many isolated units of 
Indian troops which were now all under attack. Then he heard their screams as their posts 
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were overrun and they were killed, one by one. These broadcasts have also been described by 
a British officer, Major Henstock, who recalled his memories of listening, similarly helpless, 
from the HQ radio.65 Mani did not learn until later that other Indian soldiers had been burned 
alive when their post in a cinema was set on fire.  
Eventually, after a series of failed telephone calls, Kundan was able to make get one 
through to Mani, who he assumed had radio contact with HQ. In Mani’s account, Kundan 
begged him to get a message to Mallaby to call a truce, but Mani explained that all 
communications were disrupted and his own troops and RAPWI staff were pinned down. 
Mani now pleaded with Kundan to use a car to get physically through the city to take his 
message.66 At the time, Mani did not know that he had lucky to have even returned to the 
hotel at all after his lunch with Kundan. Mani’s earlier contact with local Indonesian 
nationalists appears to have saved his life. Des Alwi, a young nationalist in Surabaya, who 
later became a prominent journalist and speech writer, recorded in his diary of the battle:  
 
We were secretly preparing a city-wide attack on the British at 5pm on Sunday 28 October, because 
they had broken both promises to (a) keep within 800 metres of the harbour - they had now occupied 
the city with 22 outposts - and (b) not to bring in Dutch military personnel - we had proof several had 
come in as part of the British landing party... 
From a distance I felt the truck looked familiar. I had frequently seen it in the British (Command) 
Headquarters. It seems I was not mistaken. As the truck approached I recognized Jenkins, the Daily 
Mail journalist, and Shri Mani, the public affairs officer for the British forces, and a few other foreign 
journalists whose name I now cannot recall. 
I jumped onto the road shouting, ‘Don't shoot! Don't shoot! They're not British, they're journalists!’ I 
kept running hither and thither waving my arms up and down to indicate they should hold their fire. 
Whew! They held fire. Saved by the bell! 
Later that afternoon, at 5pm, 28 October, the first phase of the Battle for Surabaya took place...by the 
end of three days fighting more than 600 British and British-Indian troops had been killed.67 
 
Mani’s official dispatch of 6 November covers the rest of that terrifying night of October 28 
and its aftermath.68 This dispatch was written after Mani had been evacuated to Singapore and 
it is a sombre document, very different in tone from almost all of the other official dispatches 
Mani posted either before or after. In it, Mani recounts the increasing pressure which the 
journalists and troops in the hotel came under. With casualties increasing, and knowing from 
the radio that the SEAC situation was extreme and no help was coming, they decided to 
surrender. They were then driven to a jail in an open backed truck, jeered along the way by 
the crowds lining the way. Once again, however, Mani’s connections with Indonesian 
nationalists proved significant. The following morning, on October 29, Amir Sjarifuddin came 
to visit Mani and the other prisoners in the cells after he, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta had 
flown into the city earlier in the day to try to organise a truce. Sjarifuddin arranged for Mani 
and the other journalists to be moved into 'protective' internment, where they were kept for 
four days as Mani’s dispatch describes.  
While they were in this protective custody, the situation worsened dramatically. The 
ceasefire held for a short time, but then outbreaks of fighting led to an attempt at negotiation 
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between the local Indonesian leadership and the English late on 30 October. Kundan served as 
interpreter for the Indonesians. Before he and the others had completed their negotiations, 
mixed messages from the British led to the eruption of firing again at the Internatio Building. 
In this melee, Brigadier Mallaby was killed. During this time, the Indonesians holding Mani 
and his group tried to evacuate them by train from the town, but they were unable to do so 
safely and so brought them back to the internment site. In the tense days which followed 
Mallaby's death, the British Indian troops worked together with regular Indonesian army 
personnel to evacuate the 6,000-odd European internees, whom the British had previously 
moved into Surabaya, to ships in the port. The British did not evacuate the far greater number 
of Eurasians and Chinese residents of the city, who had also been interned by the Indonesian 
republicans.69 When Mani and the other journalists with him were finally released, they spent 
a day or two gathering their belongings before they were evacuated on November 5 to 
Singapore. Only then did Mani write his long dispatch and post it on November 6. The 
surviving Indian troops, who had lost more than 500 comrades, had retreated into the port area 
of Surabaya to regroup. There they were reinforced in large numbers when the British moved 
in a further two brigades of the Fifth Indian Division.70 
On November 10, the day Mani returned to Surabaya from Singapore, there was an 
unmistakable massing of troops around the docks. Many believed that the new British 
commander, Major-General Mansergh was determined to take revenge for the humiliation 
meted out to the British forces on October 28 and afterwards. Mansergh issued an ultimatum 
to the Indonesians, which was clearly too humiliating to accept in its demand that the 
Indonesians disarm and surrender the city to the British. On November 10, the leaders of all 
Indonesian groups in the city met and decided to fight to the death rather than surrender. The 
battle went on for over 100 days of bitter street-to-street fighting, in which many thousands of 
Indonesians died, as did hundreds of Indians and some British troops.  
Several accounts of this conflict now exist written by Indonesian fighters, and by non-
Indonesian sources which have drawn on Indonesian memoirs and oral histories. However, 
none of these published works discuss the Indian perspectives, although most perpetuate the 
misapprehension (which continues to be held by many people in Indonesia today) that all the 
South Asian troops were Nepali Gurkhas.71 As discussed, even those authors such as 
McMillan and Doulton who write about Indian troops, do so largely if not exclusively from 
SEAC and British sources.72 The details of this bitter fighting from the perspective of Indian 
troops can, however, be read in documents in the P. R. S. Mani Collection. Mani stayed with 
them during the whole of the battle for Surabaya, sending dispatches most days which 
documented the tenacity and courage of the Indian soldiers. In particular, he wrote about the 
growth among them of pan-Asian solidarity as they discovered, rescued and cared for the 
many Chinese, Indian and Eurasian internees of the Indonesians whom the British had left 
behind.73  
Yet when Mansergh declared the battle officially ‘won’ in December, Mani had had 
enough. ‘Much grieved with events in Indonesia’, he requested a transfer back to India where 
he resigned from the army early in 1946.74  
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Reporting pan-Asianism: the hidden transcript revealed 
While a Captain in the Indian Army, Mani did not take the route of publishing his frustrations 
in the Indian press, although a few journalists in similar positions, still enlisted in Burma, for 
example, did begin to leak their stories. On arriving in India, however, Mani immediately 
gained employment with the Free Press Journal of Bombay as a Foreign Correspondent. 
Returning to Indonesia, he found the hostilities were still ongoing, but this time he could 
negotiate with the British and the Dutch military authorities to gain access or information, 
rather than remain silent as a serving officer within the British Army. Nonetheless, as his 
diaries show, Mani still felt trapped by his need to bargain with these authorities about how 
much he revealed to the readers of the Free Press Journal. As he explained in both his 
application to the newly independent Indian Foreign Service in 1947, as well as in his 1986 
book, he felt committed to learning the story of the Independence struggle from the 
Indonesian side but he was also seeking to maintain his commitment to the Indian troops with 
whom he had travelled. 75 
This commitment demanded his return to report one part of the Indian troops’ story in 
Indonesia on which previously he had been prevented from commenting. Mani wanted to 
follow the stories of the Indian soldiers who had decided to act on their sympathies with the 
Indonesian freedom struggle and cross the lines to join the nationalists. However, in order to 
try to protect these men from pursuit and prosecution by the British, he agreed to delay 
indefinitely the writing their stories for his Indian readers.76 The timing of Mani’s decision to 
eventually go public with this story brings home to us the accuracy of James Scott’s 
theoretical musings on the strategic moments when power relations between oppressors and 
the oppressed shift and the hidden transcript of resistance is suddenly revealed.77  
On 30 October 1946 Mani’s article on the Indians fighting for freedom from imperial 
rule alongside the Indonesians appeared in the Free Press Journal. It arrived at a key time in 
India’s own freedom struggle, on the back of the momentous Delhi ‘Red Fort’ trials of 
November 1945 to March 1946, the public outcry over which eventually led the British to 
commute the sentences of the three main INA officers found guilty; as well as the mutiny of 
the Royal Indian Navy, and of elements of the British Indian Army, in February 1946. Mani’s 
decision to publish was specifically spurred on by another key event: the decision taken by 
SEAC, under intense pressure from Nehru and the nationalists in India, to withdraw 
completely all Indian troops from Indonesia. Mani feared that these Indians who had 
‘deserted’ would be left behind.  
His article in the Free Press Journal was headlined:  
A New Unity Forged Abroad Among Indian Soldiers:  
They Fight For Their Country Out There In Indonesia.78 
 
In keeping with the prevailing mood in India, where by October 1946 many had come to 
regard the INA as nationalist heroes rather than treasonous traitors, Mani opened with the 
statement: ‘Another Indian National Army is writing history in that island fortress of 
freedom, Java, in defence of the Indonesian Republic.’ Having established this patriotic 
lineage, he then explained that his story could now be told as Nehru had assured parliament 
that the government of India would not tolerate ‘any subterfuge or delay in the withdrawal of 
Indian troops’. Mani then brought into full and complete view the theme which had threaded 
together all his diverse dispatches since 1944, as well as appearing in strands through his 
wartime journalism. His article proceeds by stating that among the 600 ‘gallant men’ of this 
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new INA were ‘Punjabis, Madrasees, Pathans, Mahrattas – Hindus, Muslims and Christians, 
once again proving that outside British control Indians of all communities tend to unite’. He 
noted that the soldiers who had refused to wage war on Indonesia had greeted him in 
Jogyakarta with the INA greeting ‘Azad Hind’ [‘Free India’]. They had also been concerned 
to emphasise their idealism as freedom-fighting soldiers of conscience, as Mani duly 
reported: 
 
‘It is true that some were attracted by material things. But the choice between two bigger issues lay in 
us and we chose the more honourable one. We decided that aspirers of freedom cannot become 
freedom suppressors’, they said.’ 
 
In Mani’s hidden transcript made public, the Indian National Army lived on, fighting another 
anti-colonial war in Southeast Asia. But it was able to do that only because Indians had not 
succumbed to the British tactic of dividing and ruling and instead, were in unity in their 
passionate commitment to an end to colonialism, both in Indonesia from the Dutch and in 
India from the British.  
Finally, Mani related an incident from that terrifying Surabaya night of October 28, 
when he and his colleagues had been besieged in the Liberty Hotel by Indonesian forces, 
which he had long kept to himself but now felt able to write about:  
 
In the raging battle of Sourabaya, a ribboned Rajput hero of Burma who lay dying with an 
Indonesian bullet in his heart exclaimed to me: 
  "Ham Dutch ke liye kion marna hai, Sab?"  
 - "Why should we die for the Dutch, sir?"79 
 
Mani concluded with this very personal and powerful experience in order to explain 
the political motivations of the Indian soldiers who had joined the Indonesian Revolution. The 
man whose death he witnessed had been decorated for valour in battle (‘ribboned’), he 
continued to respect his officers (he called Captain Mani ‘Saab’ or ‘Sir’), and he belonged to 
the Rajputs, who had for over a century been favoured by the British as ‘martial’. In this Mani 
appealed to the very mythology of ‘martial races’ which all of his work had challenged. Yet 
he needed to make sure this vignette hit home as widely as possible. For Mani, the poignant 
last words of this loyal Indian soldier, the epitome of the ‘martial’ mythology, dying far away 
from home in a foreign land, appear to have conveyed a lasting judgement on India’s entire 
wartime involvement. It was not just the meaning of his own death but the entire defence of 
colonialism that this Indian ‘hero of Burma’ had come to question with his final breath. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has focussed closely on the writings of one individual in order to tease out the 
tensions between his public and private writing. The first type of Mani’s official writing 
discussed was that in his role as Army PR officer, with dispatches sent ‘for approval’ to 
British HQ before they went to Indian troops in 1944 (in Manipur during the war) and 1945 
(in Indonesia under the command of SEAC). The second type of his public writing was for a 
different audience, when he wrote as a war correspondent for the Indian press in 1946. His 
private writing is found in pages of his personal diaries in 1945 and 1946, both groups written 
Indonesia. It is unusual to have such a diverse set of sources and in this case it allows the 
tensions between public and private – and in this case, between colonial subject and 
nationalist advocate - to become visible. Moreover, this is the only Indian-authored writing 
we appear to have which was written deliberately, for public circulation, by an observer 
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associated directly with the Indian forces which were utilized under British command in 
SEAC in Indonesia after the war was over. There are accounts of Indian views which are 
extracts from the British censors’ translations of troop letters home in a range of different 
theatres of conflict.80 The British were eager to learn about the concerns and anxieties of 
Indian troops, and were even more concerned to hear about rumours which might be and 
circulating.81 Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, letters home which have been translated 
during surveillance censorship must raise both linguistic and interpretive questions about 
power, including how accurate the translation might have been, both linguistic and cultural, 
and whether the specific audience to whom it was written might have read something very 
different in it than did British surveillance officers. The evidential testimonies given by 
Indian troops and analysed by Gajendra Singh are extremely valuable, but while deliberately 
public, they too are constrained by being given within the very narrow conventions of 
adversarial court case evidence.82  
In considering the tensions between Mani’s various types of writing, it has been 
useful to draw on James C. Scott’s explorations of the forms of resistance available to 
disempowered subjects.83  Scott’s 1985 Weapons of the Weak recognises the relational nature 
of dissent which may appear to be individual, such as ambiguous appearances of compliance 
or avoidance, which is useful in understanding Mani’s modified compliance with the task he 
was set to ‘build Indian troop morale’. His approach to doing so was consistent with his 
understanding of the underlying unity among Indians, regardless of religion, ethnicity, 
language or caste, which was a very different approach than that which had been taken by the 
British Army in its recruiting processes to stereotype Indian populations as ‘martial’ or 
otherwise. Imperial strategies of ‘divide and rule’ into which the ‘martial races’ narrative had 
fed, were the target which Mani was seeking to undermine in his apparently innocuous 
‘human interest’ stories about the wide diversity of Indians who in fact made up the Indian 
Army. Mani had to put in a huge effort to find these diverse troops, given the majority of 
Indians recruited were still from the north western states, but he went to this trouble in order 
to build a mosaic which showcased a diverse but united Indian army and – by implication – a 
diverse and united Indian population.  
James’ 1990 book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, has 
also been useful firstly for its recognition of the performative nature of interactions of power, 
and the ways in which ‘hidden transcripts’ operate among the powerful as well as the 
disempowered. This approach has been further developed by Gajendra Singh, in Anatomy of 
Dissent who points out the shift in British recruiting practices in response to changing troop 
dissent. James’ 1990 argument furthermore seeks to explain the underlying resistance which 
may precede what are often thought of as ‘spontaneous’ outbreaks of violence by the 
powerless.   
As discussed in this article, the sustained undercurrent in Mani’s work during the war, 
from the Burma campaign, is the unavoidable, everyday, reality of diversity among Indian 
troops which nevertheless allowed intense loyalty to each other. This narrative, scattered in 
his Manipur dispatches as individual vignettes was fuelled by his commitment to national 
independence which, given his consent in accepting an army role, required this moderation so 
that while the war was being fought, his view was not explicit in his official writing. Once the 
war was ended, however, the British decision to use Indian troops in SEAC was much less 
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comfortable for nationalists like Mani. His official dispatches from Indonesia betray only 
traces of his frustration, but his rising anger was strikingly evident in his diary entries. The use 
of Scott’s (1985 and 1990) and more recently Gajendra Singh’s work (2006, 2014) are 
particularly applicable to understand from Mani’s writing his building sense of anger and his 
reflections on the rising doubts and anxieties of the Indian troops he was accompanying. 
James and Singh both point to the overall recognition that power relationships generate a 
variety of ‘registers’ of address – each with different intended audiences  - on all sides. Scott’s 
1990 work in particular points to the background for what often appear to be ‘spontaneous’ 
departures from subservience, and in this case, it is very helpful in understanding Mani’s 
decision in his ‘A New Unity is Forged’ article to depart from his previously cautious mode of 
public address. 
In this case, Mani burst out into the open in his ‘A New Unity Forged…’ article with 
the ‘transcript’ which had shaped all his earlier work, although never being expressed 
explicitly, in both Manipur during the war and in Indonesia afterwards. This was Mani’s 
conviction of the underlying unity of all Indians AS Indians, regardless of religion, caste or 
ethnicity. It was, he argued, only the British who were trying to break apart this unity of 
purpose. The context of the INA trials had pitted the British against Indian independence, 
bringing together not only INA supporters but nationalists like Nehru and Gandhi who had 
opposed the tactic of armed insurgency and whom Mani admired deeply. Fearing the 
abandonment of the Indian soldiers who had crossed the lines to fight for the Indonesians, 
Mani was pushed into revealing the ‘hidden transcript’ with which he had sought covertly to 
build resistance to British colonialism.  
We can finally return here to the question of why Mani chose to include his ‘Battle of 
Manipur’ collection in the bundle of papers he kept safe for decades in order to write his 
book about the intense and challenging experiences he had in Indonesia. It was these 
dispatches, the 80-odd vignettes about the diversity among all those everyday Indians who 
fought so courageously for their country during the war, which demonstrated what Mani 
meant in his October 1946 article. This was the new Indian national army – the diversity of 
men who had loved the idea of independence so much – for their country as well as for 
Indonesia - that they had refused to fight any longer for army of colonisers and so they had 
crossed the lines.  
